tailwart/LESSONS.md

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Harden mail edge: PG-race healthcheck gate, :443 SNI fan-out, docs Fixes the root cause that was silently dropping Stalwart's cert/setting writes, completes the public HTTPS endpoints, and captures the debugging knowledge. - docker-compose.yml: gate the ts-stalwart healthcheck on Postgres reachability (nc -z the-record-prod:5432) in addition to tailscaled health. Stalwart's depends_on: service_healthy can no longer release it into the window where the tailnet route to Postgres isn't up yet — which was failing table init and losing in-flight cert writes (-> rcgen). - caddy/caddy.json + README: add the :443 SNI fan-out. mta-sts / autoconfig / autodiscover pass through to stalwart:443 (Stalwart terminates TLS with its wildcard cert; no proxy_protocol on :443). All other SNIs go to the box's web Caddy on :8443 (https_port 8443). L7 reverse_proxy is impossible here: CAA pins issuance to Stalwart's ACME account, so Caddy can't obtain its own cert for these names. - acl-snippet.hujson: grant tcp:443 on reverse-proxy -> stalwart for the SNI pass-through. - config/config.json: track the v0.16 bootstrap (commit-safe; the DB secret is an EnvironmentVariable reference, not inline). - LESSONS.md: symptom -> cause -> fix notes (PG race, DNS-01/Spaceship dead key, auto-ban vs PROXY protocol, wildcard-requires-DNS-01, SNI pass-through, ephemeral sidecar IP, LE rate-limit checks). - .gitignore: exclude _backup/ and _validate/ (DB dumps + an inline-secret config) and editor swap files. NEVER commit those. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-06-11 00:03:52 -04:00
# tailwart — lessons learned
Hard-won notes from bringing the mail edge up. Each entry is **symptom → cause →
fix**, ordered roughly by how long it cost. Read this before re-debugging.
## 1. Postgres startup race ate cert/setting writes
**Symptom:** TLS certs (manual import *and* ACME) would validate but never
persist — Stalwart kept serving its `rcgen` self-signed fallback. Logs showed
`Failed to create tables: error connecting to server` on most boots.
**Cause:** Stalwart shares the `ts-stalwart` sidecar's netns. Its `depends_on`
only waited for the sidecar's *own* health (`/healthz` = "tailscaled up"), which
flips green **before** the tailnet route to Postgres (`the-record-prod:5432`) is
usable. Stalwart started into that gap, failed the DB connect, and any write in
that window — including a freshly obtained cert — was silently lost.
**Fix:** the sidecar healthcheck now also requires Postgres to be reachable
(`nc -z … 5432`), so `depends_on: service_healthy` can't release Stalwart into
the race. See `docker-compose.yml`. First clean boot after this: zero PG errors,
4 live connections immediately.
## 2. DNS-01 was blocked by a dead Spaceship API key
**Symptom:** `Failed to set DNS RRSet: Unauthorized` on every record; no cert
issued; no `_acme-challenge` TXT ever set.
**Cause:** the cert design is ACME **DNS-01** via the **Spaceship** provider
(bundled in caddy/lego). The stored API key was invalid (recovery debris from an
earlier config attempt). Note `STALWART_ACME_PROVIDER` / `STALWART_ACME_TOKEN`
in `.env` are **empty and not even passed through by compose** — the provider +
secret are entered in the **admin UI** (stored in the DB), not via env.
**Gotcha:** secret fields render **blank** in the Stalwart admin even when set
(the S3 secret behaves identically). A blank field is *not* evidence it's unset.
**Fix / how to verify a key directly (egresses the box's WAN IP, same as
Stalwart):**
```bash
curl -i 'https://spaceship.dev/api/v1/dns/records/<domain>?take=5&skip=0' \
-H 'X-Api-Key: KEY' -H 'X-Api-Secret: SECRET'
# 401 application.unauthorized = bad key/secret or IP-restricted
# 200 = good
```
A fresh Spaceship key fixed it.
## 3. Stalwart's auto-ban vs PROXY protocol (the "8080 mystery")
**Symptom:** the edge box could relay mail fine but could **not** reach
Stalwart's `:8080` admin — connections accept then immediately close. Looked like
"tagged devices rejected, user phone works."
**Cause:** Stalwart's fail2ban checks the **proxied client IP** (from the PROXY
header) on the mail listeners, but the **raw connection IP** on the non-proxied
admin listener. A banned edge-box IP therefore still relays mail (ban checked
against the header IP) while direct `→:8080` is dropped (checked against the box
IP). Malformed probing of the mail ports **re-arms** the ban.
**Fix:** add `100.64.0.0/10` (and the box's WAN IP, which appears as the proxied
client when you hit the box's own public hostname) to the fail2ban allow-list.
Bans are in-memory — a Stalwart restart flushes them. **Don't rapid-poll the mail
ports** to test.
## 4. The wildcard request *required* DNS-01 (why HTTP-01 was a dead end)
With "Additional Hostnames" left empty, Stalwart requests a **wildcard**
(`*.<domain>`). Wildcards can **only** be issued via DNS-01 — HTTP-01 literally
cannot satisfy them. We burned time on an HTTP-01 + Caddy-challenge-forwarding
detour before realizing DNS-01 was the intended (and only viable) path. One
wildcard cert then covers `mail`, `mta-sts`, `autoconfig`, `autodiscover`, etc.
## 5. `:443` web endpoints need SNI pass-through, not L7 proxy
MTA-STS / autoconfig / autodiscover serve over **:443**. You cannot L7
`reverse_proxy` them through Caddy, because the **CAA** record pins issuance to
Stalwart's ACME account — Caddy can't get its own cert for those names. Stalwart
holds the wildcard, so the edge **passes TLS through** by SNI. See
`caddy/README.md` → "The HTTP side". Needed `tcp:443` added to the
`reverse-proxy → stalwart` ACL grant.
## 6. The sidecar is ephemeral — never hardcode its tailnet IP
`ts-stalwart` runs with `?ephemeral=true`, so its tailnet IP **changes on
re-registration** (an ACL re-sync did this mid-debug: `100.112.26.122 →
100.79.87.80`). Everything must use the MagicDNS name
`stalwart.tail7b1641.ts.net`. A hardcoded IP will mysteriously go
`Network is unreachable`.
## 7. Don't trust crt.sh for rate-limit checks
crt.sh was flaky/empty all session. To gauge Let's Encrypt's weekly
duplicate-cert limit, use **certspotter** instead:
`https://api.certspotter.com/v1/issuances?domain=<d>&include_subdomains=true`.
Also: LE limits are dimensioned — **failed validations** are hourly (5/hr/host,
the one a retry storm trips), **issued duplicates** are weekly (5/wk). A renewal
task hammering every 10 min trips the hourly one; consolidate to a single task.